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The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research is a familiar 
one in research ethics. This chapter argues that the term "therapeutic research" 
is a misnomer. r consider two broad types of ostensibly therapeutic research: 
controlled trials, and innovative/experimental treatments. I argue that in the 
former case the term therapeutic research is a misnomer because no reasonable 
researcher can expect patients/subjects to derive any therapeutic advantage 
from being entered into an ethically conducted controlled trial. In the latter 
case, while accepting that there may well be a reasonable expectation of 
therapeutic benefit from innovative treatments, I argue that the decision 
whether it is in the interests of a given patient to receive a given treatment is 
properly made on purely clinical grounds. There is no special feature of the 
research situation, in either of these types of case, which serves to ensure that 
participation, qua research subject, is in a patient's interests. 
2. "Therapeutic" and "Non-Therapeutic" Research 
The distinction between "therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic" research is a 
notable feature of versions of the Helsinki Declaration of the World Medical 
Association, which sets out an ethical framework for the regulation of medical 
research involving human subjects, from the original 1964 version of the 
declaration, up to and including the I 989 revision. The I 989 version of the 
declaration refers to a "fundamental" distinction between 
medical research, in which the aim is essentially diagnostic or therapeutic 
for a patient, and medical research, the essential object of which is purely 
scientific and without implying direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to 
the person subjected to the research. 1 
Some searching questions could be asked about the therapeutic-non-
therapeutic distinction drawn here. We might for example question the 
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assumptions apparently embodied in this statement concerning the relationship 
between diagnostic procedures and research. Are we to consider all diagnostic 
procedures to be forms of research (despite the fact that, standardly, diagnosis 
applies, but does not yield, generalizable knowledge)? No doubt the case for 
such a view could be argued. But if it were ever to become a generally 
accepted view, the implications for clinical practice would be radical-since 
clinical diagnostic procedures would then fall under the particularly stringent 
ethical frameworks developed for research. 
We could also question the particularist emphasis in the above quotation. 
suggested by the phrase "diagnostic or therapeutic for a patient" (my 
emphasis). Are we to take it that therapeutic research necessarily, or even 
typically, has as its essential aim the production of direct therapeutic benefit 
for particular patients? And if so, how is this to be squared with the more 
familiar view that the essential aim of research is the generation of generaliz-
able knowledge? 
Notwithstanding the above worries, the distinction benveen therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic research has attained considerable currency. Most 
introductory medical ethics textbooks, if they deal with research ethics at all, 
will at least mention the distinction, which is typically explicated with 
reference to the intentions of the researcher.2 This approach is given canonical 
form in Jan Kennedy and Andrew Grubb's Principles of Medical Law, where 
therapeutic research is said to be characterized by a "dual intention" on the pan 
of the researcher.~ In therapeutic research there is an intention on the part of 
the researcher ''both to seek to benefit the patient who is the research subject, 
and to gather data of a generalizable nature." In non-therapeutic research, by 
contrast, there is "only a single intention: to gather data.',.~ 
This reference to the researcher's intentions does not seem an altogether 
happy one, in that it seems to involve an implicit appeal to what we might call 
a "reasonable researcher" standard, which would be much better made explicit. 
In order to rule out examples of irresponsible experimentation, based on 
unreasonable expectations of therapeutic benefit, from qualifying as therapeu-
tic research, the Kennedy and Grubb characterization of therapeutic research 
would be better reformulated as "research intended to produce generalizable 
data, and to benefit the patient/subject of the research, where the relevam 
research procedure could reasonably be expected to delil•er such a result." 
Reformulated in this way, however, the Kennedy and Grubb interpreta-
tion suggests that there exists a distinctive form of medical research in which 
the twin goals of delivering therapeutic benefits to patients/subjects, and of 
generating generalizable data, are intrinsically linked. In this chapter, my 
central focus will be the concept of therapeutic research, understood in this 
way. I will argue that, when it is so understood, the term "therapeutic research" 
is a misnomer. No ethically conducted program of medical research can 
construct the sort of essential link between the therapeutic goal and the 
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scientific goal, which the above characterization implies. After considering and 
dismissing two different broad types of research which might (erroneously, in 
my view) be termed "therapeutic." I will close with some thoughts on why the 
point is an important one, and on what would be a more appropriate label for 
so-called therapeutic research. 
3. Controlled Trials 
To begin however, let us consider some salient features of the general ethical 
context within which biomedical research is pursued. The principle that a 
doctor is obliged to treat her patients according to the best proven diagnostic or 
therapeutic method is a well-established principle of biomedical ethics.5 This 
principle is for example enshrined in successive versions of the Helsinki 
Declaration.6 And yet there is an evident tension between adherence to this 
principle, and the involvement of patients in any form of medical research. 
Unless the research in which the patient is involved bears no relation to 
her condition at all (in which case, for all but the most trivial complaints, their 
involvement as research subjects is questionable in itself), the patient/subject 
will be likely to be the recipient of an unproven treatment. Where this 
treatment is given as an alternative to the established best standard treatment 
for the condition the patient clearly does not receive the best proven treatment 
for his/her condition, for the simple reason that both the efficacy of the 
treatment in question, and the severity of any associated risks, are not yet 
proven. In a case in which the treatment given is in addition to the established 
standard treatment the patient/subject may well receive the benefits of both 
treatments. But she will also be exposed to the risks associated with both. 
These may well be compounded, and in the case of the non-standard treatment 
will be, again, unproven. 
This tension between the principle that patients are entitled to the best 
proven treatment for their condition, and the involvement of patients in 
research, is implicitly acknowledged in the 2000 version of the Helsinki 
Declaration. which requires that when research is combined with clinical care, 
patients/subjects should be assured of the best proven treatment at the 
conclusion of the study.7 Of course, the requirement that patients are given 
access to the best proven treatment at the conclusion of a study does not 
necessarily preclude their having access to that same treatment at an earlier 
stage. But in many research contexts, and most clearly in controlled clinical 
trials, some patients at least will not receive the best proven treatment during 
the course of the study (namely, those receiving the experimental treatment); 
nor will all patients necessarily receive the best proven treatment at the 
conclusion of the study- for example if their treatment regime remains 
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unchanged, and the new "best proven" treatment is the fonner experimental 
treatment. 
In order to evade some of the ethical difficulties associated with adminis-
tering unproven treatments to patients in research contexts, it is standard, in 
research, to apply a negative version of the principle that patients should 
receive the best proven treatment: no patient should receive a known inferior 
treatment.K So in a controlled clinical trial, whether randomized or not, and 
whether placebo-controlled or not, the researcher proceeds ethically if and only 
if she remains in a state of equipoise between the different anns of the tria1.9 
From the point at which it becomes clear that one of the anns of the trial is 
receiving markedly inferior treatment it is unethical to continue with the tria1.10 
It is an interesting question whether this entails that it is unethical ro 
demand very rigorous standards of proof in controlled trials. It may well be 
clear to the researcher that one or other arm of the trial has a therapeutic 
advantage some time before fully statistically significant results have emerged. 
But at the point at which the researcher can reasonably be said to "know" that 
one arm of the trial is subject to a therapeutic disadvantage it seems unethical, 
by the above principle, to continue with the trial, regardless of whether fully 
conclusive results have yet been obtained.11 For our purposes however, the 
more relevant implication of the principle of equipoise is that there can be no 
reasonable expectation of therapeutic advantage to a patient from being 
entered into an ethically conducted controlled trial. In an ethically conducted 
placebo-controlled trial there can be no good reason to think that the active 
treatment is superior to the placebo. If there is good reason to think the active 
treatment is superior then the trial is unethical, since equipoise is lacking; and 
if there is no good reason to think that the active treatment is therapeutically 
superior (or inferior) to the placebo, there is no good reason to think that there 
will be any therapeutic advantage whatever to the patient from being entered 
into the trial. Whatever the researcher's intentions may or may not be then, 
ethically conducted placebo-controlled trials cannot reasonably be character-
ized as " therapeutic" research, since no reasonable researcher could expect any 
therapeutic advantage to accrue to the patient from being entered into the trial. 
Suppose however that the trial is not placebo-controlled, and the control 
is the established standard treatment. In this case adhering to the principle of 
equipoise requires that there should be no good reason to think, either prior to 
or during the trial, that the standard treatment is either superior to or inferior to 
the treatment(s) under test. From the point at which it is established that either 
the new treatment or the control is markedly superior it becomes unethical to 
continue the trial. Again then, in an ethically conducted trial, there can be no 
reasonable expectation of therapeutic advantage to the patient from being 
entered into the trial-assuming that the alternative for the patient is that of 
receiving the standard treatment. 
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So much then for the idea that controlled clinical trials represent a form 
of essentially therapeutic research. There can be no reasonable expectation of 
therapeutic advantage from being entered into such a nial; and no reasonable 
researcher, advising a potential research subject on whether to participate in an 
ethically conducted controlled trial, is in a position to claim that therapeutic 
considerations have any bearing on the patient/subject's decision. From the 
point of view of the patient/subject the only relevant question is whether she 
wishes to contribute to the furtherance of the scientific goal, with the 
inconvenience and risks this may entail. 
4. Innovative Treatments 
I want now to consider those forms of research which can reasonably be 
termed "innovative" or "experimental" treatments, that is, forms of biomedical 
research involving patient/subjects which either involve no comparison with a 
formal control, but only informal comparison with existing treatments, or no 
"comparison" at all , where there is no established treatment for the patient's 
condition. It turns out that these types of case also fail to merit the "therapeutic 
research" label, though for different reasons. 
1 have said that so-called therapeutic research is standardly characterized 
with reference to the dual therapeutic and research goals of the researcher. In 
turning to consider innovative treatments, it is reasonable to ask about the 
relationship between these two goals; and in particular whether they are ever 
essentially linked, such that the therapeutic goal is fulfilled by a process that 
simultaneously and necessarily involves the fulfilment of the research goal. 
(To clarify: if it were to be decided, as mentioned earlier, that diagnosis 
constitutes a form of research, this would qual ify as a case in which the 
research goal and the therapeutic goal were essentially linked.) Raanan Gillon 
suggests that research and therapy are never linked in such a way when he 
remarks: 
so-called therapeutic research always has two components: a component 
of pure research intended to produce generalizable medical knowledge, 
and a component of therapy, where the intention is to benefit the particu-
lar patient.12 
This way of putting the point suggests that the "therapeutic research" label 
might be seriously misleading: there is in fact no distinct type of research 
which is inherently therapeutic, as the "therapeutic research" label suggests. 
Rather, therapeutic and research goals can sometimes be achieved through 
what is, essentially, one and the same process-though it is a contingent matter 
that this ever happens in practice. To appreciate the full significance of this 
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point, we need to step outside the narrow perspective of the researcher. which 
has, up to this point, been our preferred mode of access to "therapeutic" 
research, and consider the decision whether to participate in research paying 
close anention to the interests of the potential research participant. 
Suppose we are dealing with an innovative/experimental treatment, in a 
case in which there is no established treatment for a patient's condition. The 
new treatment will have been subject to extensive laboratory-based testing 
prior to being available for use in a clinical context, and from this testing a 
reasonably clear picture of the likely risks and benefits of the treatment will 
have emerged. The decision to utilize this new treatment in a given case will, 
from the researcher 's standpoint, have two motives: the motive of producing 
therapeutic benefit, and the motive of procuring generalizable knowledge. 
However, a consideration of the interests of the individual patient suggests that 
it is only the aim of producing therapeutic benefit that is relevant when 
deciding whether to consent to the new treatment. If, on balance, and bearing 
in mind the relative paucity of evidence, there seems to be a reasonable 
likelihood of therapeutic benefit to a given patient, then we may judge that the 
experimental treatment is clinically indicated in her case. 
What kind of net benefit we need look for, and how much likelihood of 
producing it is required, will depend upon a host of other factors. not least 
amongst which are the severity of the patient's condition, and the severity of 
anticipated side effects. The associated question of how much risk-taking on 
the part of the doctor and the patient respectively is permissible, or required. is 
also relevant here. One area in which the label "therapeutic research" might be 
thought to have important application is in relation to experimental treatments 
for A IDS and related conditions. Controversy in these sorts of cases has tended 
to cluster around the issue of access to experimental treatments, and the rights 
of sufferers, particularly terminally ill sufferers, to expose themselves to 
potentially very high risks. In particular, the issue has been medical paternal-
ism, and whether the medical profession has the right to prevent patients who 
wish to take risks from doing so. Nothing I say here should be taken to imply 
that patients should not be allowed to expose themselves to risks as research 
subjects. Rather, my concern is whether there is a branch of research with 
respect to which participation qua research subject can reasonably be expected 
to confer therapeutic benefit. 
A patient considering an experimental treatment, where there is no estab-
lished standard treatment, will certainly be hoping for therapeutic benefit. But 
the patient's motives are not the most important thing here. Even in the more 
common case of a placebo-controlled trial the patient will no doubt be hoping 
to have been included in the active arm of the trial, and will be hoping that the 
active treatment is therapeutically effective. Nevertheless. from the research 
ethics standpoint. the important question in such a case is whether we have 
something approaching proof that the treatment under test is likely to be 
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therapeutically beneficial. If we have, then the trial is unethical-since the 
placebo arm will then be receiving a known inferior treatment. If there is no 
good reason to expect therapeutic benefit from the treatment under test the trial 
is ethical, but the patient's hope is (so far as we know) a mere hope. Similarly, 
in the innovative treatment case, it is not the patient's hopes but the re-
searcher's reasonable expectations which are of prime importance. 
However, because in the case of innovative/experimental treatment we 
are not dealing with a formal trial, in which one or other arm of the trial stands 
to be therapeutically disadvantaged, the decision to administer the treatment 
comes down to this: is this particular innovative treatment clinically indicated? 
The answer to this question will either be "Yes" or "No"; and only if there is 
reasonable expectation of therapeutic benefit to the patient will the answer be 
"Yes." In this latter case then, unlike those of non-therapeutic research, and 
controlled trials, there may be a reasonable expectation of therapeutic 
advantage to the patient. Indeed the ethical acceptability of the treatment 
regime qua treatment regime will hinge on this. But despite the fact that, in 
this type of case, the patient in question may be said to have an interest in 
receiving the innovative treatment, and despite the hope shared by all 
concerned that the innovative treatment will tum out to be effective against her 
condition, she cannot be said to have an interest in serving as a research 
subject that is in any way parallel to that in which she has an interest in 
receiving the innovative treatment. It may well be that it is in our patient's 
interests that the research be carried out But it does not follow that she has an 
interest in serving as a research subject, exposing herself to the associated 
inconveniences, and risks. We can certainly talk of patients benefiting from 
research through an improved understanding of their condition, and potential 
treatments. But from the fact that we can say with confidence that an improved 
understanding of my condition will result from my participation as a research 
subject, it does not follow that this benefit to me accrues to me conditionally 
upon my participation in the research. Any benefit to me that accrues from a 
given study accrues on the condition that the study is carried out, not on the 
condition that I participate in it. (And my participation in the study is not, 
except possibly in highly unusual circumstances, a condition for the study to 
be carried out.) From the fact that 1 will benefit from the study then, it does 
not, in general, follow that it is in my interests to participate-for the benefit to 
me will accrue whether 1 participate or not. 
This is not to suggest that the patient cannot share the researcher's dual 
goal of the production of therapeutic benefit and the furtherance of biomedical 
knowledge. The point is simply that only one of these intentions is relevant 
when considering a given patient' s receipt of an innovative treatment, under 
the heading of "therapeutic research." That the innovative treatment is 
clinically indicated is both a necessary and a sufficient ethical precondition for 
administering it in a given case. That administering the innovative treatment 
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will also contribute to the acquisition of generalizable knowledge is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient ethical precondition for administering it in a given 
case. (Not necessary because a patient should not be denied access to a 
clinically indicated treatment just because administering the treatment in this 
case would be valueless in research terms; not sufficient because while 
knowledge might be gained even where the treatment is not clinically 
indicated, it would be wrong to administer the treatment where there was no 
expectation of therapeutic benefit- bear in mind that we are dealing here with 
patients, not with healthy volunteers). 
So although the innovative/experimental treatment case does look to be 
one in which it is possible to proceed ethically while fulfilling the dual goal 
which we have seen is characteristic of so-called therapeutic research, closer 
inspection reveals that the question whether the innovative treatment is 
clinically indicated is the only one that really matters in a given case. So, as 
Jonathan Montgomery points out, the decision whether to proceed with an 
innovative treatment is best viewed as a matter of clinical ethics, rather than of 
research ethics.13 There is no essential link between fulfilling the research 
intention and acting in the interests of a particular patient. 
To return to Gillon's characterization of therapeutic research then, every-
thing, I have suggested, hinges on quite how the two components he 
distinguishes are taken to be related. If they are understood to be essentially 
linked, such that, so far as we know. subjects could not receive such and such a 
therapeutic benefit without participating in a study designed to produce 
generalizable knowledge, then the established idea of therapeutic research 
would retain some validity. However. none of the forms of research we have 
considered manage to forge an essential link between participation as a 
research subject and anticipated therapeutic benefit. In the case of an ethically 
conducted controlled trial, considerations oftherapeutic advantage do not enter 
in. In the case of innovative/experimental treatment. with no formal control, 
the therapeutic intention is the only relevant intention when we are considering 
whether it is in the interests of a given patient to participate. In both types of 
case it looks as if the two components, of therapy, and of the generation of 
generalizable knowledge, are only accidentally related. 
The final type of case I want to consider is that in which participation in 
research is a precondition for receiving treatment- patients are effectively 
denied treatment unless they participate. Here, it seems to me, the patient's 
situation is in certain respects similar to that of the subjects of an innovative 
treatment. The decision whether to participate. where made with the patient's 
interests at heart, must rest exclusively on the potential therapeutic benefit-
any anticipated research payoff is not to enter into the calculation, since this 
cannot be legitimately cited as a reason why this patient should participate in 
this study. Where the two cases do differ markedly, of course, is in the element 
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tive/experimental treatments are, in general, ethically suspect, the effective 
coercion of research subjects is ethically unacceptable. It follows that this sort 
of case cannot be cited as an example of the existence of a form of ethically 
acceptable research properly characterized as "therapeutic." On the basis of the 
above examples then, we may conclude that the idea that there is a specific 
form of research in which the pursuit of the research goal and that of the 
therapeutic goal go hand in hand is an illusion. 
5. Some Implications of the Above, and a Suggestion 
The above considerations suggest that the "therapeutic research" label is a 
misleading misnomer. Why, particularly, does this matter? The upshot of the 
points I have been considering is that participation qua research subject is 
always fundamentally an altruistic act. This is of particular relevance to 
research with vulnerable groups. When considering non-therapeutic research 
with competent non-vulnerable adults we accept that, because participation as 
a subject is a significantly altruistic act, their consent is essential. Participants 
are inconvenienced, and may be exposed to significant risks, for no benefit to 
themselves. For these reasons we are normally hesitant about asking members 
of vulnerable groups to participate in non-therapeutic research. The potential 
for exploitation when working with such groups is increased, not least because 
it may be difficult or even impossible to obtain informed consent from them. 
In the case of therapeutic research on the other hand, it may be tempting to 
follow the route which is standard in clinical ethics and, where informed 
consent is unobtainable, allow ourselves to be guided by the patient's best 
interests, rather than by their choices. As long as we hold to the worryingly 
widespread myth that participation in "therapeutic" research is beneficial to the 
subjects of that research then, we may think we see a way open to relaxing 
consent requirements for so-called therapeutic research with vulnerable 
groups. Indeed, this is precisely what we find in current guidance on research 
with children. Non-therapeutic research on children is currently discouraged, 
unless the research in question would be virtually risk-free. The Medical 
Research Council, for example, suggests that only negligible-risk, non-
therapeutic studies involving children are acceptable.14 The reason for this, as 
Jonathan Montgomery reminds us, is that "in non-therapeutic studies there is 
no obvious benefit to be gained and it can be suggested that children are being 
put at risk for no possible gain."15 
When we turn to the guidance concerning "therapeutic" research how-
ever, we find that here "higher risks may be acceptable," since in this case "it 
is hoped the child will benefit."16 (Indeed it seems that legally it may be 
permissible to proceed with "therapeutic" research against the express wishes 
of the child concerned, provided the parents' consent has been obtained. 17) On 
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this basis it is held that where valid parental consent is indeed forthcoming, "it 
is easy to justify [children's] involvement in therapeutic srudies".18 As I have 
argued at length above however, participation in so-called therapeutic research 
cannot reasonably be held to carry any benefits for research participants. Jf J 
am right, we should not be prepared to relax consent requirements for 
therapeutic research involving children in any such way. Proceeding with more 
than minimal-risk research with children, will, even given parental consent, be 
no more acceptable in the "therapeutic" case than in the ''non-therapeutic" 
case. Moreover, since participants in so-called therapeutic research will 
necessarily be patients, and since patients as such can reasonably be said to 
represent a vulnerable group, there may well be grounds for imposing more 
stringent consent requirements for all such research. 
If research involving patients is not to be termed "therapeutic," what 
should we call it? My suggestion would be: "Medical research combined with 
medical care." This is the formula employed in the 2000 version of the 
Helsinki Declaration, and it has the merit of explicitly directing our attention to 
the fact that the subjects of such research are simultaneously subjects of 
medical care. Instead of being a case in which it is appropriate to relax the 
stringent ethical safeguards governing medical research, and fall back on the 
standard clinical framework, which permits a good deal of risk-taking. based 
on an estimation of the patient's interests, this formula suggests that, prima 
facie at least. the "therapeutic" research context is one in which the require-
ments of borh clinical and research ethics frameworks apply. The declaration 
does not speak of a relaxing of consent requirements when medical research is 
combined with medical care. but on the contrary counsels: ''when medical 
research is combined with medical care, addirional standards apply to protect 
the patients who are research subjects [my emphasis]."19 
NOTES 
I. WMA Declaration of Helsinki ( 1989), quoted in British Medical Association, 
Medical Ethics Today: Its Theory and Practice (London: BMA publishing, 1993), p. 
198. 
2. Alastair Campbell, Grant Gillett, and Gareth Jones, Medical Erhics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). pp. I 71- I 72. 
3. Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb. Principles of Medical Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. J998), p. 71 6. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Sophie Botros, "Equipoise. Consent, and the Ethics of Randomised Clinical 
Trials." Ethics and Law in Health Cure and Research, ed. Peter Byrne (London: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1990), p . 9. 
6. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki ( 1989), para. 11.3, 
http://www.augsburg.edu/irb/helsinki.html; World Medical Association, Declaration of 
Helsinki (2000), para. 30, http://www.wma.net/e/policylb3.htm. 
is "TherapeuTic Research" a Misnomer? 239 
7. Ibid. 
8. Botros, "Equipoise, Consent, and the Ethics of Randomised Clinical Trials," p. 
18. 
9. Baruch A. Brody, The Ethics of Biomedical Research: An International Per-
spective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 7. 
I 0. See Jan Kennedy, "The Law and Ethics of Informed Consent and Randomized 
Controlled Trials," Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991 ). 
II. Ibid., p. 219. 
12. Raanan Gillon, '"Fully' In formed Consent , Clinical Trials, and the Bounda-
ries of Therapeutic Discretion," lnfonned Consent in Medical Research, eds. Len Doyal 
and Geoffrey Tobias (London: BMJ Books, 2001 ), p. 263. 
13. Jonathan Montgomery, " Informed Consent and Clinical Research with Chil-
dren," In fanned Consent in Medical Research, eds. Doyal and Tobias, p. I 74. 
14. Medical Research Council, Issues in Research with Children (London: MRC, 
1991 ). 
15. Jonathan Montgomery, " Informed Consent and Clinical Research with Chil-
dren,"p. 179. 
l6.lbid., p. 173 . 
17. /bid., p. 177. 
18. Ibid., p. 179. 
19. Declaration of Helsinki, para. 28. 
